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How to Live? 
One Question and Six or Seven Life Lessons with Albert 
Memmi 
Debra Kelly  
University of Westminster  
Il s’agit en somme d’une longue entreprise, d’un seul livre constitué par 
un emboîtement de livres l’un dans l’autre. J’aime cette façon de mettre 
une œuvre dans une autre et une troisième dans une seconde. Ce n’est pas 
là un artifice, je crois au contraire que c’est l’expression même de la réalité 
qui va se creusant, se découvrant de plus en plus profonde.  
 
(It’s a long enterprise, it’s one single book made up of a linked series of 
books, one inside the other. I like that way of putting one work inside 
another and a third inside the second. It isn’t an artifice but just the 
reverse: I think it’s the very expression of reality entering more and more 
deeply into itself, progressively revealing its own depth.) 
 
Albert Memmi, Le Nomade immobile
1
   
 
 
A Life of Writing: “Stages on the Same Journey”2 
It is perhaps obvious to begin by saying that the work of Albert Memmi 
is wide-ranging both in breadth and in time, covering more than half a 
century of literary works, socio-political studies and essays of various types 
– whether academic or for the wider public. In addition to his creative work 
beginning in 1953 with La Statue de sel (The Pillar of Salt) and continuing to 
1988 with Le Pharaon (The Pharaoh) and the later collection of short stories 
Téresa et autres femmes (Teresa and Other Women) in 2004, he has made, in a 
series of important studies on various types of oppression and dominance, 
original contributions to political, sociological and psychological thinking 
with concepts such as the “duo” and “la dépendance” (dependence), and his 
definition of racism adopted by the Encyclopaedia Universalis.
3
 It is therefore 
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important to understand what this long career as a writer and a thinker 
means and how both the author himself and his readers may assess it. 
Memmi‟s work is, in every sense, a “life project”: a coherent project pursued 
throughout his long life as an intellectual, but also as the member of a 
minority group, as he has consistently reminded his readers. It is therefore a 
personal project that is intimately intertwined with the life experiences of an 
individual, yet has implications for understanding broader communities and 
societies.
4
 The implication – and sometimes explicitly stated intention – is 
that this is a life project from which the individual concerned and others 
who read the work can learn something, at both private and public levels, 
concerning the functioning of human interactions. The work from 2000 
onwards with the publication of Le Nomade immobile (The Stationary Nomad), 
then, for example, the Dictionnaire critique à l’usage des incrédules (Critical 
Dictionary for the Use of Non-believers) in 2002 and Testament insolent (Insolent 
Testament) in 2009 represents Memmi in his eighties explicitly “taking stock” 
of his life, his career, his writing, his various contributions to sociology and 
politics. This “taking stock” increasingly takes what can be termed in the 
broadest sense a philosophical turn, to be understood in both the more 
popular and academic senses. These recent texts revisit a number of issues 
and themes from previous works, sometimes in a very similar format and 
form of expression. There is a certain sense of repetitiveness and, as one 
critic has noted, one aim of this seems undoubtedly to be: “la garantie et la 
prolongation de l‟écriture et de sa publication” (to guarantee and to prolong 
his writing and its publication). Memmi writes retrospectively in order to 
“accéder à un ordre analytique” (reach an analytical position) and this “self-
mastery” leads to “la sagesse présente dans les derniers textes, dont la 
fragmentation est révélatrice d‟un soin de détachement et de l‟apaisement 
longtemps poursuivi” (the wisdom present in the later texts, whose 
fragmentary style reveals the care taken to achieve the detachment and calm 
which he has pursued for a long time).
5
 Is this the wisdom of old age? The 
consciousness of ageing is already very explicit in the prologue and epilogue 
to Le Nomade immobile and reappears in the first chapter of his Testament 
insolent, linking the two texts with a similar aim although almost a decade 
separates them. What is strikingly absent in these texts of late life, however, 
is any sustained meditation on old age, on the process and meaning of 
ageing and on death itself. Memmi‟s way of writing and of ensuring 
continuing publication and new audiences may be seen as an implicit 
acknowledgement of ageing, but the themes and concepts tackled are rather 
familiar to previous readers of Memmi‟s work. This is all the more 
surprising given Memmi‟s implicit and explicit references to Montaigne (to 
whom I shall return) and the original essayist‟s own discussion of the 
meaning of old age. It may be that Memmi is unconsciously working within 
the framework of Erikson‟s socially conservative and “positive ageing” work 
that rids the experience of growing older: “[…] of ambivalence and 
ambiguity. Rather than a brute process of disengagement and decline, 
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ageing becomes a meaningful progression through a hierarchy of stages, 
each closer to perfection than the last”.
6
 In Erikson‟s generational scheme, 
the “ego goal” for old age is integrity, the positive attribute which combats 
despair.
7
 Since ageing is an inescapable element of the human condition, it 
could have captured Memmi‟s attention, particularly given the injustices 
and forms of oppression that contemporary societies visit on their own 
ageing populations. However, he chooses rather the notion of an inventory 
to review and revisit the ideas of a lifetime, writing in 2000: 
Dirais-je que toute mon œuvre jusqu‟ici aura été un même 
effort d‟inventaire, tantôt grâce à la fiction, tantôt grâce au 
portrait, à l‟essai, ou même à la recherche la plus 
technique qui me permet la vérification précise, la 
formulation mathématique de tel ou tel point de cet 
itinéraire : voilà le sens et la place de tel travail 
sociologique sur le racisme, d‟une étude psychanalytique, 
ou d‟une investigation sur la connaissance d‟autrui.
8
 
(I might say that all my work up to the present has been 
part of the same effort to take stock, sometimes through 
fiction, sometimes through a portrait or an essay, or even 
through the most technical kind of research which enables 
me to make a precise verification, a mathematical 
formulation of this or that point on the itinerary. That‟s 
the meaning and the place of a given social study of 
racism, or psycho-analytical study, or research into the 
knowledge of others.)  
What then, does such an inventory of a lifetime of writing mean? 
Memmi and Philosophy: “bien penser pour bien agir”9 
C’est en racontant mon échec philosophique que je suis devenu écrivain. Je 
suis un éclopé de la philosophie, et sans doute l’écriture m’a-t-elle 
littéralement sauvé. 
(It was while describing my failure as a philosopher that I became a writer. 
I am a casualty of philosophy, and, unquestionably, writing literally saved 
my life.) 
 
Albert Memmi, Le Nomade immobile
10
  
For all his professed failure with regard to philosophy as a young man, 
and his rejection of his initial wish to be a philosopher, Memmi constantly 
alludes in these later texts to a philosophical impulse in his work. In the 
introduction to the Dictionnaire critique, he notes that: “Ce dictionnaire est 
aussi, d‟une certaine manière, mon journal et celui de notre temps. Mais on y 
verra également, je l‟espère, l‟esquisse d‟une philosophie” (This dictionary is 
also, in a way, my diary and a diary of our time. But there will also be found 
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in it, I hope, the sketch of a philosophy).
11
 Like Montaigne, frequently 
referred to in his writing, Memmi constructs his dictionary: “afin de 
m‟épargner mes propres errements, complaisances et complicités” (to spare 
myself my own wanderings, complacencies and complicities).
12
 Focusing 
then primarily on some of Memmi‟s later publications from 2000 onwards, 
in which he is clearly aiming to construct some sort of “bilan”(an evaluation, 
an assessment) of his life and work, this articles takes as its premise the 
notion that both the author and his reader may take a series of “life lessons” 
from the “conclusions” (however provisional) at which he arrives. Although 
a similar observation to this – that the meditation on individual experience 
finds multiple and diverse forms of expression and opens up the potential 
for the understanding of a more universal experience – can be said of other 
writers, it is particularly true for Memmi‟s project.
13
 Memmi began this 
project by making clear the universal dimension of his own experience and 
that of the Jews of Tunisia in the first part of the twentieth century, showing 
how a particular situation of oppression may reveal the dynamics 
underlying all systems of subjugation. Of his political and sociological 
studies Portrait du colonisé, précédé de Portrait du colonisateur (The Colonizer and 
the Colonized) remains a seminal text for Postcolonial Studies, and his work 
on Jewish identity and on racism, for example, places him among the most 
important thinkers in these domains as well. It is in his first key theoretical 
text that Memmi presents his concept of the “duo” (here colonizer and 
colonized), which is later applied to the duos of white/black; man/woman; 
Jew/non-Jew, etc. He shows the two members of the “duo” to be 
inextricably linked as he uncovers the working of the power relationships 
between them, and indeed he has been referred to as “le philosophe des 
duos.”
14
 Reviewing this concept in Testament insolent, Memmi defines it 
succinctly – the definition of ideas and concepts increasingly becoming a 
kind of culmination of his thinking – “le duo n’est pas une simple rencontre, 
accidentelle et sans conséquences, entre deux partenaires ou deux adversaires: ils en 
sont tous les deux transformés” (the duo is not a simple encounter, accidental and 
without consequences, between two partners or two adversaries: both of them are 
transformed by it)
15
. His work on colonization is his best-known, and has 
tended to overshadow his thinking in other areas and disciplines, notably on 
the notion of “dependence”, to which he has made no less important 
contributions. His work on dependence can be considered a development of 
his analysis of the functioning of dominance at work in human relationships 
and behavior, although there are important differences in dominance and 
dependence. The latter rests on need and therefore pleasure, according to 
Memmi, and while dominance is unstable, dependence is a force of stability. 
The notion of dominance and its functioning preoccupied Memmi‟s thinking 
for many years, but he emphasizes his fascination with the discovery of 
dependence as fundamental to the human condition:  
En tout cas, j‟ai tendance à penser que la dépendance est à 
la racine de notre condition d‟humaine. Elle n‟est pas un 
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vice comme l‟affirment certains moralistes, ni une maladie 
comme veulent le croire certains médecins; elle nous 
constitue depuis notre naissance et nous accompagne le 
long de notre existence.
16
  
(Anyway, I tend to think that dependence lies at the root 
of our human condition. It is not a vice, as some moralists 
claim, nor a sickness, as some doctors would like to 
believe; it is what constitutes us from the moment of our 
birth and accompanies us throughout our lives.) 
Notably, his definition links it to desire: “la dépendance est une relation 
contraignante avec un être, un objet, un groupe ou une institution, réels ou idéels, 
et qui relève de la satisfaction d’un besoin ou d’un désir" (dependence is a 
constraining relation to a person, an object, a group or an institution, whether real 
or ideal, and is very like the satisfaction of a need or a desire).
17
 Indeed, 
dependence becomes integral to his philosophical thinking “si la philosophie 
a surtout comme but la compréhension de l‟être humain,” (if philosophy has 
as its foremost goal the understanding of the human being), and it is the 
basis of a philosophy of alterity, and of social relations.
18
. Among his other 
seminal concepts, Memmi has also devoted studies to the relations between 
men and women (since the fundamental “duo” in society is that of the 
couple) which entail, in his analysis, both dominance and dependence. His 
work as a whole can indeed be summed up as a “philosophy of human 
relationships,”
19
 studying as it does all forms of domination, oppression, 
and (inter)dependence. Memmi has himself frequently explained the ways 
in which his thinking developed from the individual case to the universal 
dimension, and how the two are interlinked. He uncovers the mechanisms at 
work in the power balance of human relationships on both micro- and 
macro-levels, moving, for example, from the dynamics of the relationship in 
a Tunisian-French marriage, the relationship between colonizer and 
colonized, to the relationship between the Jew and the rest of the world: “Du 
même coup, je venais d‟entrevoir un phénomène infiniement plus vaste, 
plus térrifiant: la relation de la dominance qui ordonne les rapports de tant 
d‟êtres humains” (At the same time I had just glimpsed an infinitely more 
vast and more terrifying phenomenon: the relationship of dominance which 
governs the mutual dealings between so many human beings).
20
 At the same 
time, he has no illusions concerning the limits of the passage from the 
individual to the universal in its practical application and does not hold back 
on the analysis of his own position and motivations: 
En tant qu‟un homme moral aspirant à l‟universel, le sort 
de tous les hommes devrait m‟être également 
préoccupant. Mais je ne suis pas un homme universel, je 
suis d‟abord un homme singulier, avec des attaches 
particulières. Mes liens avec les autres hommes se diluent 
à mesure que m‟en éloignent la culture et la géographie. 
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La fameuse déclaration de Montesquieu sur la préférence 
qu‟il accorde au général sur le singulier, à l‟humain sur le 
familial, est mal interprété, me semble-t-il: ce n‟est pas un 
constat, c‟est un souhait éthique, une décision juridique.
21
 
(As a moral being aspiring to the universal, the fate of all 
humans should concern me equally. But I‟m not a 
universal man; I am firstly an individual, with particular 
attachments. The further I am from other men culturally 
or geographically, the weaker my links with them grow. 
Montesquieu‟s famous declaration about the preference he 
accords to the general over the individual, the whole of 
mankind over his own family, is, I think, misinterpreted: it 
is not an observed fact but an ethical aspiration, a juridical 
decision.) 
Among other constantly re-worked problematics in Memmi‟s work are the 
question of the liberation of the collective and the individual in the face of all 
forms of oppression, the ensuing search for identity and, bound up 
inextricably and essentially with this, the quest for a “truth” about human 
existence and for a set of values, for a way of being in the world. Memmi has 
also talked about all the facets of his work as being interconnected and of 
how his life is itself further interconnected with his published work: 
Chacun de mes livres aura été une étape d‟un même 
itinéraire. J‟aurais passé la majeure partie de ma vie à 
écrire. L‟écriture m‟a souvent servi de béquille ; chacun a 
la sienne, de sorte que ma vie et mon travail se répondent ; 
de sorte que parlant de l‟une je parle de l‟autre, et 
inversement [...] J‟ai sans doute plus fortement besoin de 
m‟expliquer, de plaider peut-être.
22
  
(Each of my books will have been a stage on the same 
journey. I will have spent the greater part of my life 
writing. Writing has often served me as a crutch; everyone 
has their own, so that my life and my work correspond to 
each other, and in speaking of one I am speaking of the 
other, and vice versa. […] Unquestionably, I have a 
stronger need to explain myself, to plead, perhaps.) 
What then is the reader to make of this “pleading”? In Le Nomade immobile, 
Memmi is very clear about his disappointment with the philosophy 
professors at the Sorbonne (at which he studied after the Second World War, 
following his earlier studies in the subject at the University of Algiers) and 
the impact on his initial enthusiasm for philosophy that had begun with his 
admiration for his teacher at the French lycée in Tunis. Yet in his writings of 
old age, the writer and sociologist again turns increasingly into a 
philosopher as he surveys his life, explains and justifies his work, and makes 
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clear his version of certain events in his life. Memmi, the perhaps reluctant 
philosopher, pursues a set of values by which to live, and although far from 
constituting a philosophical “system” or treatise, these represent an 
articulation of how to conduct oneself within human society, and of how to 
analyze that society in order to live as well as one can without falling dupe 
to the various “illusions” that beset rational thought. Describing Testament 
insolent he tells us that he finds the term “philosophical” difficult and that it 
does not quite describe his aim:  
En somme, il s‟agit à la fois d‟un plaidoyer et d‟un 
testament philosophique? C‟est également vrai, même si je 
ne tiens pas tellement à l‟adjectif philosophique, trop chargé 
et rebutant pour beaucoup. Mettons plutôt une tentative 
d‟autobiographie, philosophie inclusive. Leçons d’une vie, 
plus modeste, m‟aurait peut-être convenu davantage.23  
(All in all, is it at once a plea and a philosophical 
testament? That is equally true, even if I don‟t really like 
the word philosophical, a somewhat loaded term that many 
find off-putting. Let‟s say, rather, an attempted 
autobiography, with philosophy included. The more 
modest lessons of a life would perhaps have suited me 
better.) 
If we follow Memmi‟s method, then we can move from the individual 
“lessons of a life” to the more universal “life lessons”. For all his hesitation 
around the term “philosophy”, his commitment to the role of the intellectual 
writer is clear. For Memmi, the writer is necessary to his society and he 
maintains an ethical position on writing as for other social behavior: a 
writer‟s work should be a kind of testimony to a way of living, and as I have 
previously suggested, a way of being in the world. From the publication of 
Portrait du colonisé onwards, Memmi became, as he says (using Sartrean 
terminology), “un écrivain engagé” (a committed writer), and this 
commitment affects the status of his work.24 Once again describing writing 
as a “plea”, Memmi powerfully underscores the ethical dimensions of its 
implications for both writer and reader (by slightly misquoting Baudelaire in 
the infamous first poem of Les Fleurs du mal, notably omitting the word 
“hypocrite” before Baudelaire‟s own address to the reader): 
Ma littérature, sinon toute littérature, est un aveu et un 
plaidoyer. Un aveu donc un plaidoyer : je ne suis pas 
méchant puisque j‟avoue, puisque je sollicite la 
compréhension du lecteur et la rémission [...] C‟est le 
soulagement de la confession, confession réciproque où 
l‟auteur, se confessant, confesse son lecteur – “Lecteur, 
mon semblable, mon frère!”
25
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(My literature, if not all literature, is a confession and a 
plea. A confession and therefore a plea: I‟m not playing a 
trick, because I confess, because I beg for the 
understanding of the reader and for remission […]. It is 
the solace of confession, reciprocal confession in which the 
author, by confessing, hears the confession of the reader – 
„Reader, my likeness, my brother!‟) 
It is this recognition of the self of the writer laid out before the reader, and in 
whom the reader recognizes himself, that again brings to mind another 
writer and perhaps reluctant philosopher frequently mentioned by Memmi 
– Montaigne. The remainder of this article is constructed with an 
acknowledgement to the award-winning biography in which Sarah 
Bakewell recently brought a new life of Montaigne to the attention of the 
English-speaking world, her How to Live: A Life of Montaigne in one question 
and twenty attempts at an answer.26 Montaigne‟s essays, as Blakewell says, 
rarely explain or teach anything, but:  
He used his experience as the basis for asking himself 
questions, above all the big question that fascinated him as 
it did many of his contemporaries. Although it is not quite 
grammatical in English, it can be phrased in three simple 
words: „How to live‟. This is not quite the same as the 
ethical question: „How should one live?‟ […] He wanted to 
know how to live a good life – meaning a correct or 
honorable life, but also a fully human, satisfying, 
flourishing one.27  
This chimes well with the epilogue to Nomade immobile, as will be seen in the 
concluding remarks here. 
A fitting analogy may therefore be made with the position of 
Montaigne, who, for all his sense of self-knowledge and self-acceptance later 
in life, retains a fluidity and a relativism with regard to the self that make his 
notion of identity appear “modern” to contemporary readers, and who is 
credited in intellectual and literary histories with inventing the essay form, a 
form much used by Memmi in many and varied ways. Montaigne “practises 
wisdom” in writing, and has a way of talking about the self that is not 
introverted, but results rather in more attentive observation of the outside 
world. It is the experience of the everyday and of the small realities of 
human existence, as well as the “large truths”, which are indispensable to 
both Montaigne and Memmi. Memmi tells us that Montaigne sometimes 
tries his patience, but like so many of Montaigne‟s readers, he also refers to 
him as a friend and sees something of himself in him. Among Memmi‟s 
favorite bedside books are, he tells us, “les moralistes, Montaigne surtout 
[…] qui est toujours de bonne compagnie (n‟avons-nous pas presque la 
même vie, lui dans sa tourelle, moi dans mon grenier?)” (the moralists, 
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especially Montaigne […] who is always good company (haven‟t we led 
almost the same life, he in his tower and I in my attic?))28. Memmi is often 
severe about his own conduct and that of others, in keeping with the 
moralist he felt he had to become since he refused religious faith: “je suis 
devenu, surtout, un moraliste: pour expliquer et légitimer ma conduite 
autrement que par un acte de foi” (I have become, above all, a moralist: to 
explain and legitimize my behavior otherwise than by an act of faith). 29 The 
headings of many of the chapters in Le Nomade immobile serve to indicate the 
major stages in Memmi‟s life and thought: “La révolte ou le néant”; “Le prix 
du savoir”; “Le pont suspendu”; “L‟apprentissage de la solitude”; “Retour 
au pays”; “Fécondités de l‟exil”; “Les appartenances multiples”; “La 
dimension juive”; “Nous somme tous des dépendants”; “Le salut par 
l‟écriture”; “La religion : une fiction commode”; “Il n‟existe pas de société 
sans morale”; “La politique : attachement et détachement”; “La philosophie : 
bien penser pour bien agir” („revolt or nothingness‟; „the price of 
knowledge‟; „the suspension bridge‟; „the apprenticeship of loneliness‟; 
„return to the native country‟; „fecundity of exile‟; „multiple belongings‟; „the 
Jewish dimension‟; „we are all dependents‟; „salvation through writing‟; 
„religion, a comfortable fiction‟; „there is no society without morality‟; 
„politics: attachment and detachment‟; „philosophy, thinking rightly in order 
to act rightly‟). One of the striking aspects of Le Nomade immobile is the often 
pitiless analysis that Memmi exercises on himself and on others around him, 
and the reader begins to understand how the writer forged this individual 
moral stance mentioned above: 
Au lycée, j‟embarrassais mes professeurs par des 
questions à contre-courant; je continuais à l‟université, 
contre les doctrines en vogue – le marxisme stalien et le 
catholicisme, qui prévalait alors à la Sorbonne. Plus tard 
contre l‟existentialisme, un certain structualisme, puis le 
lacanisme qui leur disputa la place. Non que je fusse 
toujours sûr de moi, mais là encore la critique – 
l‟autocritique, bien sûr – était la règle pour mieux diriger 
ma pensée. Je me méfiais de tout ce qui, devenant une 
pensée collective, ne laisse pas de place à l‟initiative 
individuelle [...] L‟intellectuel a d‟autant moins de droit de 
ruser avec la vérité qu‟il est plus outillé pour la découvrir, 
et qu‟on l‟attend de lui. S‟efforcer de voir clair et dire 
clairement est sa fonction, sinon à quoi sert-il ?  
C‟est durant mes années au lycée que je forgeai ma 
doctrine à cet égard.
30
  
(In high school I embarrassed my teachers with questions 
which went against the current; I continued to do this at 
university, against the doctrines then in vogue: Marxist 
Stalinism and Catholicism, which were the prevailing 
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trends at the Sorbonne. Later, against Existentialism, a 
certain Structuralism, and then the Lacanianism which 
aimed to replace them. Not that I was always sure of 
myself, but there too criticism – and self-criticism, of 
course – was my rule for the better guidance of my 
thinking. I mistrusted everything which, becoming a 
collective way of thinking, leaves no room for individual 
initiative […]. The intellectual has the less right to play 
about with truth insofar as he is better equipped to 
discover it, and as people expect it from him. His function 
is to do his utmost to see clearly and speak clearly – 
otherwise, what is he there for? 
It was during my years in high school that I worked out 
my doctrine on all this.) 
As previously noted, Memmi would have perhaps preferred, more modestly 
he tells us, to have called his “testament”, “lessons of a life”, one life then, 
his; but there are life lessons to be drawn not only for the individual 
concerned but also for others, and the quotation above makes explicit what 
Lesson One will be. 
One: Think For Yourself 
In Le Nomade immobile, Memmi fully acknowledges the importance of 
his education in his ensuing revolt against his background: “[…] le savoir! Je 
devais le recueillir patiemment, pieusement” (knowledge! I had to gather it 
patiently, devoutly)31, but the ensuing resentment and guilt towards his 
family is as terrible for the old man who writes Le Nomade immobile as it was 
for the young man who wrote La Statue de sel. In Le Nomade immobile, Memmi 
makes clear that he had to distance himself from his family and “judge 
them”; resentment finally turned to compassion, but the relationship became 
no easier: 
Pour faire mon salut, il me fallait également prendre mes distances 
avec les miens, c‟est-à-dire aussi les juger. Et lorsque le 
ressentiment se fut transformé en compassion, ce ne fut pas plus 
commode. Je ressentis la vrille de la culpabilité [...] Je le payerais 
cher. En me punissant […] j‟étais toujours occupé à comprendre, 
afin d‟agir plus efficacement. De la pitié ou de la violence, je ne sais 
pas ce qui est le plus difficile à vivre.
32
  
(To find my own salvation I also had to distance myself 
from my family, i.e. to judge them as well. And when my 
resentment had been transformed into compassion, it was 
no more comfortable. I felt pangs of guilt […] I would pay 
dearly for this. By punishing myself […] I was always 
busy understanding, so as to act more effectively. Pity and 
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violence: I don‟t know which of the two is more difficult to 
live with.) 
The role of any thinker is not to tell people what they want to hear, but what 
s/he believes is right and just. S/he must not be afraid to incite criticism, 
and must also be self-critical.33 The need to think independently has not 
decreased as Memmi ages, but increased given the uncertainties of the 
contemporary world which remains, in his view, full of illusions and 
stupidity. As long as religion takes advantage of these uncertainties, as do 
nationalism and hatred of the other, and while the media acts irresponsibly, 
old, discredited ideas return. Memmi opens the Dictionnnaire critique by 
explaining that the aim is to test some of the ideas that help him think, and 
in so doing he shows how those he takes as his targets may purport to 
“think”, to promote and defend a belief system of one kind or another, but 
they care little for truth and their “thought” only serves to reinforce their 
own ideas and that of the group to which they belong.34 Indeed, to think 
openly and honestly, one has to be a “heretic”.35 The thinker should respect 
nothing and no-one, except truth – to which I will return – and the road to 
truth is a long and difficult one.36 Indeed, one way to think for oneself is to 
write one‟s own Dictionary, as Memmi advises us to do, just as he as, in 
order to navigate the times in which one lives.  
Two: Being Means Being Different 
Memmi‟s own identity wounds may have healed, but the scars remain 
even as an old man, and those scars are the consequences of his original 
battles with the issues of being Jewish, North African, of poor origins: 
Je m‟empresse d‟ajouter que cette angoisse, si elle n‟est pas 
totalement apprivoisée, me procure le sentiment d‟une 
victoire relative sur le sort et sur moi-même. Lors de la 
parution de mon premier livre, qui déjà fut un inventaire, 
on en a quelquefois cité cette phrase : “Indigène dans un 
pays de colonisation, juif dans un univers antisémite, 
Africain dans un monde où triomphe l‟Europe..." Il n‟y 
avait pas que cela dans l‟ouvrage, mais ce passage en 
résumait l‟un des aspects principaux. Or le temps a passé. 
Je suis maintenant de nationalité française, même si je n‟ai 
pas renié ma citoyenneté d‟origine et si demeurent en moi 
des fidélités tenaces. Le racisme est partout stigmatisé, 
même s‟il n‟est pas toujours commode d‟être juif. Il n‟est 
plus si infamant d‟être d‟origine africaine, même si 
persiste le malheur d‟Afrique. Quant à la pauvreté, 
n‟ayant guère de goûts dispendieux, une honnête carrière 
universitaire a suffi à mes besoins. Bref, mes blessures se 
sont renfermées, même si les cicatrices sont là, bourrelets 
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gênants qui se rappellent de temps en temps à mon 
attention.
37
  
(I hasten to add that this anguish, although not totally 
subdued, also provides me with a sense of relative victory 
over fate and over myself. When my first book, which was 
already a stock-taking, appeared, there was a passage 
which was often quoted: „Native of a colonized country, 
Jewish in an anti-Semitic universe, African in a world 
where Europe was triumphing…‟ There was not only that 
in the book, but that passage summed up one of its main 
aspects. Now time has gone by. I now have French 
nationality, though I have not renounced my original 
nationality and fiercely retain old loyalties. Racism is 
condemned everywhere, though it is still not always 
comfortable to be Jewish. It is no longer so shameful to 
come from Africa, though Africa‟s wretchedness still 
persists. As for poverty, never having had expensive 
tastes, an honest university career has sufficed for my 
needs. In short, my wounds have healed, even though the 
scars are there, painful patches which remind me of their 
existence from time to time.) 
For Memmi, the experience of poverty and the internal conflict caused by 
the awareness of being poor brought about the development of a political 
awareness. Poverty is, for him, a form of oppression that must always be 
seen in relation to wealth, another form of dominating and being dominated 
which forms such an important part of Memmi‟s critical and sociological 
thinking: “En somme, oui, je fais de la pauvreté une variété de l‟oppression 
[…] La pauvreté est relative à la richesse, qui l‟entretient dans l‟obsession de 
sa misère.” (Altogether, yes, I count poverty as a type of oppression […] 
Poverty is relative to wealth, which keeps it obsessed with its own 
wretchedness).
38
 It is, however, above all his Jewish identity that had an 
impact on Memmi‟s thinking and on his conduct, and he insists on the 
inescapable fact of difference – noting especially a certain hypocrisy in how 
his thinking on Jewish identity has been received: 
Contre ceux qui ne voulaient pas reconnaître la spécificité 
de la condition juive – qui, après m‟avoir applaudi lorsque 
je dénonçais la condition des colonisés, me suspectaient 
d‟un attachement réactionnaire à la judéité, et, plus 
généralement, me reprochaient de donner trop 
d‟importance à la notion de la différence, prêtant ainsi 
flanc à l‟agression raciste, et rendant l‟intégration plus 
difficile, étc. [...] j‟ai écrit : “Etre, c‟est être différent.” Je 
continue à le penser, parce que ce n‟est pas une 
revendication mais l‟énoncé d‟un constat: on n‟existe pas 
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comme un être abstrait, mais comme individu singulier, 
avec des caractéristiques et des attaches particulières [...] 
La différence est un fait; je n‟en fais pas pour cela un 
drapeau, ni une arme. Il n‟y a pas de quoi en être fier, ni 
s‟en affliger. Elle ne légitime en rien une surenchère de 
soi.
39
 
(Against those who did not wish to recognize what is 
particular about being Jewish – who, after applauding me 
when I denounced the conditions of the colonised people, 
then suspected me of a reactionary attachment to 
Jewishness and, more generally, reproached me for 
according too much importance to the notion of difference 
and thus opening up a front to racist aggression, making 
integration more difficult, etc. […] I wrote, „Being means 
being different.‟ I still think so, because it is not a claim but 
a statement of an observed fact: one does not exist as an 
abstract being but as a specific individual, with particular 
characteristics and attachments. […] Difference is a fact; 
which doesn‟t mean I make it into a flag or a weapon. It‟s 
not something to be proud of or to get upset about either. 
It does not justify over-valuing oneself.) 
If “being means being different,” the challenge, as Memmi says, is to 
reconcile our individual differences. Memmi has himself inhabited a space 
that is “in between” (his own image, used for the title of a chapter in Le 
Nomade immobile, is being on a pont suspendu, a suspension bridge) as he has 
engaged in the struggle to remain in solidarity with the community from 
which he came, while being critical of it when necessary within a wider 
analysis of the effects of colonialism on the identity of the individual and of 
the community, and more widely on power relations in human relationships 
and behavior. As he writes in Testament insolent, the ideal state is: “ne pas 
nier son appartenance, ne pas refuser sa solidarité, mais ne pas céder aux 
mythes des siens: à l‟occasion, si nécessaire, on doit en dénoncer les dérives 
et les excès” (not to deny one‟s belonging, not to refuse one‟s solidarity, but 
not to give in to the myths of one‟s people: on occasion, if necessary, one 
must denounce their derivations and excesses).
40
 The individual‟s 
relationship and their belonging to the group of origin are not to be denied 
(as above), belonging being defined as: “le sentiment, plus ou moins accepté, 
que l’on a des liens indéfectibles avec son groupe d’origine ; ce qui entraîne une 
solidarité spontanée et des devoirs envers lui” (the feeling, accepted to a greater or 
lesser extent, that one has of the enduring links to one’s group of origin; which 
entails spontaneous solidarity and duties towards it)
41
, but sometimes in order to 
“distinguish between myth and reality,” those ties of belonging need to be 
loosened: “sans la renier, il faut se refuser à se laisser caractériser 
uniquement par son identité culturelle”(without rejecting it, one must refuse 
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to let oneself be defined by one‟s cultural identity alone)
42
, and in order to 
do that the elements that define that group must be questioned and, if 
necessary, criticized. 
Three: Denounce All Impostors 
Memmi‟s thinking is very much of a piece, and one position runs on 
from another. If one intention is, then, to free the individual from a total 
identification with a group and its values, then it follows that all forms of 
systemized and institutionalized thinking are to be questioned. What I am 
terming “imposters” here are many and varied – and variously called 
“fictions”, “illusions”, “hallucinations” by Memmi –, but all share one 
characteristic: they are collective doctrines of one type or another which 
profess to know the truth about human existence while concealing their real 
nature, and all prevent the individual from thinking for him or herself, 
thereby contravening Lesson One above. Religion is clearly the greatest 
imposter of them all, and no organized religion or religious interpretation 
emerges unscathed since all ultimately privilege the “divine” over the 
human and another type of “life” at the expense of this one: “Le moins 
qu‟on puisse dire enfin est que le christianisme n‟est pas un humanisme, car 
il fait abstraction de la réalité de l‟homme vivant” (The least one could say, 
finally, is that Christianity is not a form of humanism, because it makes an 
abstraction of the reality of the living human being).43 Religion is a form of 
dependence, this time on something imaginary, a supposedly supernatural 
being, and is fabricated according to a set of myths, not according to a moral 
doctrine: “c‟est la mythologie qui fait l‟essentiel des religions, non la morale 
comme on feint de croire aujourd‟hui, pour obéir à l‟air du temps” (it is 
mythology which makes up the essential part of religions, not morality as 
people pretend to believe today, in deference to the prevailing atmosphere). 
44 His greatest criticism is that religion prevents logical thinking, and 
theology takes for its object a representation that is treated as though it were 
a reality. Faith is based on an absolute conviction that has not been subjected 
to any proper experiment or testing, and for Memmi the irrational can never 
supersede the rational: “La religion est la littérature devenue folle: elle 
pretend que ses fables sont véridiques, les plus fantaisistes y compris” 
(Religion is literature gone mad: it pretends that its fables are true, even the 
most fantastical ones).45 Memmi‟s greatest tool in his method here is to 
pursue a rational line of thought applied to the belief system in question 
which ends by showing the untenable and sometimes ridiculous position it 
upholds.46 He demonstrates this to its logical, ludicrous end in the 
Dictionnaire critique while discussing the major world religions‟ arguments 
over Jerusalem, “la gare obligée pour tout départ vers le ciel,” (the 
obligatory station for every departure to heaven), and their need to practice 
the art of the exclusion of the non-righteous both within and outside their 
own religion: “Or, ici surgit un nouveau problème: chacun prétendant en 
posséder les clefs exclusives, comment les autres pourraient-ils y entrer?” 
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(Now, here a new problem arises: since each claims to possess the keys 
exclusively, how could the others enter?).47 Worse, those who are not 
believers accept that others do have religious faith, but the same tolerance is 
not reciprocated, indeed the lack of tolerance is one of the worst 
characteristics of religion,48 and those who adhere to a religion appear 
unaware of where their belief system leads if taken to its logical end: “Mais 
on est toujours puni par où l‟on a péché: cet exclusivisme, interne et externe, 
avoué ou voilé, se transforme en piège. Excluant tous les autres, chacun 
s‟exclut du reste de l‟humanité” (but one is always punished on the point 
where one has sinned: that exclusivism, internal and external, overt or 
covert, becomes a trap. In excluding all the others, each excludes himself 
from the rest of humanity).49 Religion and political doctrines – notably 
Marxism as practised and preached by “followers” of Marx, not Marx 
himself – are obvious targets, as are other doctrines such as psychoanalysis 
(again as practiced by the “anemic” descendants of Freud, not by Freud 
himself) and all rigid systems of thinking that exclude those who do not 
conform and whose goal may ostensibly be to defend the individual, but 
which in reality serve only to preserve the group and its belief system. 
Memmi also urges wariness of less obvious things – art and culture, for 
example, not as entities themselves, but because of the types of discourses – 
often “sacralizing” discourses – which distort them: “Il faut déscraliser la 
culture” is a chapter title both in Le Nomade immobile and in Testamant 
insolent, and if Memmi can write that religion is literature gone mad, then it 
follows that literature is a kind of religion. Why? Once again, because of the 
recourse to the imaginary: “l’art, comme la religion, comme la magie, est une 
tentative de maîtriser le réel par l’imagination” (art, like religion, like magic, is an 
attempt to master what is real by imagination),50 even if the imagination, as he 
fully recognises, has also helped us to survive: “Dans le projet, il y a de 
l‟imaginaire” (in the project there is also imagination).51 When Memmi‟s 
personal cultural tastes are displayed, he is much less successful in his 
argument (his dismissal of some of Marguerite Duras‟s work and of the 
French New Novel add nothing to his discussion and even undermine it), 
but the logic of his thought as a whole remains. Reason must always hold 
sway over the imagination: “En somme, sans mésestimer les données de 
l‟imaginaire, il faut toujours privilégier les conseils de la raison… si l‟on y 
arrive” (All in all, without underestimating the gifts of imagination, it is 
always necessary to give priority to the counsels of reason… if one can).52 
Distrust emotion and cultivate reason seems to be the maxim; writing about 
contemporary conflicts (and of the ways in which they are reported in the 
media), he warns: “l‟émotion ne peut remplacer une analyse sérieuse et 
globale d‟un conflit […] Nous découvrons là, une fois de plus, le rôle de 
l‟imaginaire dans la conduite et la pensée des humains, et qu‟il faudrait 
tâcher de le réduire” (emotion cannot replace a serious global analysis of a 
conflict […] We discover there, once again, the role of the imagination in 
human behavior and thought, and that one ought to try to reduce it).53 
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Emotion is certainly legitimate, and he does recognize the importance of 
emotion in art, but it does not replace rigorous thought – any lack of 
rationality in thought and behavior is attacked by Memmi. 
Four: Be a Humanist 
It therefore follows logically that the human should be the centre of our 
concerns and that above all, we must refuse to sacrifice humankind to any 
and all myths.
54
 The greatest criticism leveled at religion by Memmi is that it 
finally denigrates the value of the human. When he writes of his aims of 
“l‟esquisse d‟une philosophie” (the outline of a philosophy) at the beginning 
of the Dictionnaire critique, he makes explicit the intent: “disons qu‟il s‟agit en 
gros de montrer que l‟homme prime sur le mythes et même sur les idées et 
les groupes” (let‟s say that it is overall a matter of showing that humankind 
takes precedence over myths and even over ideas and groups).
55
 This 
adherence to the belief of giving primacy to human endeavor and survival, 
can lead to nuanced thinking by Memmi. While “culture” is considered a 
collective act in his own definition: “la culture est l’ensemble, changeant, et plus 
ou moins cohérent, des réponses d’une collectivité à ses conditions d’existence,” 
(culture is the totality, changeable, and consistent to a greater or lesser degree, of the 
responses of a collectivity to its conditions of existence), and may simply serve as 
a convenient and reassuring refuge from our fears concerning suffering, old 
age and death, because culture is something specific to humankind and is 
indeed unique to the human, it escapes the criticism directed at other forms 
of collective thinking:  
[...] elle fonde la personnalité collective, où s‟enracine et 
s‟abreuve continûment la personnalité individuelle ; elle 
inspire les sentiments d‟appartenance. A cet égard, je ne 
partage que partiellement les conceptions qui considèrent 
la culture comme une contrainte. Certes, elle est 
contrariante pour le désir individuel, afin de permettre la 
vie collective, mais, en même temps, elle offre à l‟individu 
des recours précieux. Les contraintes inventées par le 
groupe deviennent en retour des moyens de se libérer des 
contraintes naturelles, et même, paradoxalement, de se 
libérer du groupe.
56
 
([culture] is the basis for collective personality, in which 
the individual personality is rooted and constantly draws 
nourishment; it inspires feelings of belonging. In this 
regard, I only partly share the conceptions that consider 
culture as a constraint. Admittedly, it restricts individual 
desires in order to make collective life possible, but at the 
same time it offers priceless resources to the individual. 
The constraints invented by the group become in return a 
means of freeing oneself from the constraints of nature, 
D e b r a  K e l l y  |  8 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 2 (2011)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.472 
and even, paradoxically, of freeing oneself from the 
group.) 
Humanism should be the guiding principle of philosophy, and is the 
centrepiece of Memmi‟s thinking: “A quoi sert la connaissance sinon, par-
delà le plaisir de la curiosité, à maîtriser le réel à notre profit? La morale, 
sinon à régler notre conduite en vue d‟une meilleure vie commune? A quoi 
sert la métaphysique, dont la religion est l‟une des expressions, sinon mieux 
nous situer dans l‟univers ?” (What use is knowledge if not, beyond the 
pleasure of curiosity, to master reality for our benefit? What use is morality, 
if not to regulate our behavior in favor of a better communal life? What use 
is metaphysics, of which religion is an expression, if not to situate ourselves 
better in the universe?).57 We are currently, in Memmi‟s view, witnessing an 
extraordinary offensive against humanism, and it should not surprise us that 
a philosophy which places humankind at its centre should be attacked by 
any system that serves groups and ideologies. In one of his most 
unequivocal statements, Memmi proclaims the primacy of the human: 
“l‟homme doit être le centre, le critère et le but de la connaissance et de 
l‟action [...] c‟est la seule philosophie qui défende l‟homme contre toutes les 
idolâtries, religieuses, financières ou politiques, et même contre l‟homme lui-
même” (humankind should be the center, the criterion and the goal of 
knowledge and action […] it is the only philosophy that defends humankind 
against all idolatries, religious, financial or political, and even against 
humankind himself).58  Only humanism can resist the return of extremism in 
politics and religion as we are currently witnessing them. Allied to the 
importance of humanism is that of holding to non-religious principles – lay 
principles – and “laïcité”, so fundamental to the French Republic and which 
becomes in Memmi term “laïcisme”, is currently subjected to an onslaught 
from religious believers of all kinds:  
Alors que le laïcisme est la seule philosophie qui, 
socialement, n‟exclut personne, qui respecte les différences 
et les droits de chacun… sauf celui d‟exclure les autres […] 
C‟est une philosophe où tout se discute, se négocie, même 
les limites de la liberté, y compris peut-être la liberté de 
s‟exprimer. Car c‟est l‟homme qui est la mesure de tout, la 
fin dernière de la sagesse, non les dieux ou même la 
liberté : le laïcisme est très généralement un humanisme.59  
(While laicism is the only philosophy which, socially, 
excludes no-one, which respects each person‟s rights and 
differences… except that of excluding others […] It is a 
philosophy where everything is subject to discussion, is 
negotiable, even the limits of freedom, including perhaps 
freedom of expression. Because it is man who is the 
measure of all things, the last end of wisdom, not gods or 
even freedom: laicism is very generally a humanism.) 
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In terms of establishing a moral code, again humankind must be at its 
centre, and in this Memmi still follows and approves Nietzsche: “En bref 
l‟homme à la place des idoles. Si ce n‟est là une morale, qu‟est-ce que la 
morale? Le nietzschéisme est une tentative originale de rétablissement de 
l‟homme dans son intégrité et dans sa dignité” (In short, humankind in the 
place of idols. If that is not a morality, what is? Nietzschism is an original 
attempt to reestablish man in his integrity and in his dignity).60 Quite 
simply, for Memmi, the most terrible things that a human being does, are 
when s/he ceases to consider humankind as central to life.  
Five: Love and Enjoy Life 
A life in which one is constantly on guard against the delusions of the 
emotional and the irrational might seem austere, but Memmi‟s life lessons 
do not preclude the enjoyment of life, of friends and family, of love, far from 
it. Indeed one reason for retracing his thinking and his life journey, his 
“testament”, is to procure pleasure for himself. However, Memmi‟s views on 
what constitutes a good and happy life are more difficult for a generalized 
life lesson given that he unashamedly celebrates living in a heterosexual 
couple and having children. He is aware of this: “Je crains de n‟être pas au 
goût du jour en reliant ainsi la sexualité à la procréation” (I fear I am not to 
today‟s taste in linking sexuality to procreation in this way),61 but he 
remains adamant in his view, remaining faithful to his method of thinking: 
“Nous voilà encore dans un débat interminable : faut-il renoncer à la vérité 
pour ne pas risquer de passer pour rétrograde” (Here we are again in a 
never-ending debate: should one renounce truth so as not to risk seeming 
retrograde).62 Certainly it is difficult for a reader from another generation, 
gender and cultural area not to find this the area of Memmi‟s greatest self-
justification. His claim in these pages that he has defended equality and 
justice for women to such an extent in his work that no-one could question 
his attitude towards women, and that the proof of how much he loves 
women and how important they are in life precludes any charges of 
misogyny, really does resonate with the defensiveness of someone who 
protests too much. The life lesson might be then: “live in a heterosexual 
couple and have children,” but that would allow these uncomfortable 
aspects of his expression to blind us to his more interesting reflections on 
love and life, not least since he identifies it as the part of our lives where the 
imaginary is so important and therefore requires very subtle thinking on his 
part given his mistrust of the imaginary in other areas of human conduct 
and thinking:  
Soit la conduite amoureuse, où la dimension imaginaire 
est particulièrement notable […] Même la religion, l‟art 
n‟ont pas la même importance. Nous pouvons être 
croyants ou non croyants, passionés de l‟art ou 
indifférents, nous sommes tous confrontés à la 
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dépendance érotique. On trouve tout dans ce plus 
merveilleux des duos, la sexualité, la tendresse, l‟émotion 
[...] De sorte que, si nous voulons nous comprendre, il 
nous faut faire l‟inventaire de cette relation, imaginaire 
compris.63  
(It is behavior in love, where the dimension of the 
imagination is particularly noticeable […] Even religion, 
art, don‟t have the same importance. Whether we are 
believers or non-believers, passionate about art or 
indifferent, we are all confronted with erotic dependence. 
One finds everything in this most marvellous of “duos”, 
sexuality, tenderness, emotion […] So that if we want to 
understand ourselves, we need to take stock of this 
relationship, including the imagination.) 
In fairness, he does not condemn homosexuality – this would fly in the 
face of his defense of tolerance – but it poses a problem for his view of 
human relationships, as does sexual abstinence. Nonetheless, the celebration 
of an appetite for life and its joys is full of energy, and is a life lesson for 
living well. It is not surprising that Testament insolent ends with “Le bien 
vivre” (living well) in which he finally wonders if the search for happiness is 
not perhaps the final word; or that Memmi spent a year writing for Le Monde 
on “Happiness”, including those small moments of happiness which are the 
only ones that can be certain in our lives: “sagesse, bonheur et sérénité vont 
ensemble” (wisdom, happiness and serenity go together). In the epilogue to 
Le Nomade immobile, he writes: “Le bonheur est devenu pour moi une 
évidence et une nécessité” (happiness has become for me something obvious 
and a need).64 In one of his most succinct positions, Memmi sums it up: “La 
question „à quoi sert de vivre?„ est encore une fausse question, elle sous-
entend que l‟on doive vivre pour autre chose que la vie” (The question 
„What use is living?‟ is still a false question, implying that one ought to live 
for something else than for life), bringing him close once again to 
Montaigne‟s “Life should be an aim unto itself, a purpose within itself” in 
his final essay.65 Life is an end in itself, but living well requires an effort; it is 
more than a matter of constantly choosing what one should and should not 
do, and in a seemingly contradictory final position, Memmi insists that in 
order to understand human beings properly, we must understand the 
imaginary since it is an integral part of us. In the end, it is the irrational – not 
the imagination – that is the greatest enemy to living well and to allowing 
others to do the same.66  
Six: Seek Out Truth(s) 
Truth and pleasure, then, are not so far apart. Memmi is repulsed by 
any dogma which professes to possess “Truth.” This is because the rigid 
beliefs of adherents to any dogma result in a position in which they: 
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“s‟interdisent et interdisent aux autres de chercher les modestes vérités qui 
nous sont accessibles” (forbid themselves and forbid others to seek the 
modest truths that are accessible to us), when his own relationship to truth is 
very different : “Je trouve au contraire de la jouissance quand je crois avoir 
aperçu quelque rapport inédit dans le réel, fût-il minime, et le partage avec 
mes lecteurs” (On the contrary, I rejoice when I believe I have found some 
unknown connection in reality, however small, and I share it with my 
readers).
67
The search for truth is Memmi‟s most fundamental principle and 
is what has driven his thinking forward from his days as a young student of 
philosophy to the writings of his old age. He writes in his Dictionnaire 
critique that truth is aligned with experience, and that “experience” is “la 
reine des savoirs” (the queen of all the branches of knowledge): “Seule 
l‟expérience l‟ [le vrai] établit, progressivement et statistiquement. La route 
vers la vérité est longue et sinueuse, parsemée de nécessaires vérifications 
répétées” (Only experience establishes [the truth] progressively and 
statistically. The road to truth is long and winding, sown with necessarily 
repeated verifications).
68
 The quest for truth lies at the heart of his life 
project and of his writing project and is integral to the way he has lived his 
life, even though he remains troubled by this duty and about how he should, 
or indeed whether he should, share his conclusions with others: 
Le goût de la vérité est double: besoin de rechercher la 
vérité, besoin de la faire partager. Si penser juste me paraît 
toujours une obligation envers moi-même, je suis moins 
sûr de devoir l‟exiger des autres, ni même de faire 
partager mes conclusions. Pourquoi s‟échiner à révéler ce 
que l‟on croit être vrai à des gens qui ne souhaitent pas 
vous entendre? Pour se rassurer soi-même? Pour vérifier 
ce que l‟on croit avoir découvert ? Ou, et c‟est plus 
suspect, pour imposer ses vues et jouir de ce pouvoir ? 
Peut-on et doit-on tout dire? Qui nous le demande 
vraiment? Horreur! Suis-je loin des prosélytes que je 
dénonce? Je suis pris par la tentation du masque, et 
comprenne qui pourra.
69
  
(The taste for truth is double: the need to seek it out, and 
the need to share it. But although thinking rightly always 
seems to me a duty I owe myself, I am less sure that I 
ought to demand it of others, or even share my 
conclusions with others. Why wear yourself out trying to 
explain what you believe to be true, to people who don‟t 
want to understand you? To reassure yourself? To verify 
what you think you have discovered? Or – and this is 
more suspect – to impose your views on others and enjoy 
the sense of power? Can we and should we say 
everything? Who honestly demands this of us? Horrors! 
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Am I, after all, so far from the proselytes I denounce? And 
then I am seized by the temptation to mask myself, and let 
anyone understand me who can.) 
Yet, almost ten years later than this hesitation in Le Nomade Immobile, he is 
indeed still explaining, still denouncing irrational thinking, still adding a 
post scriptum in case he has not been clear enough, and “Le goût et la 
recherche de la vérité” (the taste and the search for truth) is the penultimate 
chapter title of Testamant insolent: “la recherche de la vérité est l‟une des 
principales conditions de la sagesse” (the search for truth is one of the main 
conditions of wisdom).
70
 Choosing between “philosophy” and “wisdom”, 
he finds his own definition: “bien conduire sa pensée afin de bien conduire 
sa vie” (conducting one‟s thoughts properly in order to conduct one‟s life 
properly); 
71
 and this is the underlying principle for the life lessons above 
since in the end his understanding of philosophy is: “simplement la 
meilleure manière de vivre et la recherché des moyens d‟y parvenir” (simply 
the best way of living and the search for the means to achieve it).
72
 
And Finally, Write it Down: “une seule intention 
complexe” 
To conclude, I will briefly return to Memmi‟s most complex and on 
many levels most intriguing narrative, Le Scorpion (The Scorpion, or the 
imaginary confession), published in 1969. This most complex piece of 
literature is evoked here in this final section as a reminder of the power of 
the younger Memmi‟s writing, but also to show how much of “one piece” 
Memmi‟s work is. At one point in Marcel‟s commentary on Emile‟s 
mysterious textual enterprise, he thinks that he is beginning to understand 
the method in the apparent madness:  
[…] à moins que ces différents textes ne soient pas tout de 
même indépendants. Je veux dire qu‟ils soient déjà 
destinés, sitôt jetés sur le papier, à entrer dans un dessein 
unique, plus général [...] Hypothèse farfelue, et surtout 
embarrassante ; car, alors, il n‟y aurait ni fiction, ni 
Journal, ni document, mais une seule intention complexe. Ce 
serait pire ; comment ordonner ces feuilles, sans connaîre 
cette intention, sans moyen de se retrouver à l‟intérieur 
même de ces textes?
73
  
([…] unless all these different pieces are not really 
independent. By that I mean that they were already 
intended, as they were put down on paper, to be part of 
one overall plan. […] It‟s a crazy idea, and an awkward 
one too, because in that case, there‟d be neither fiction nor 
Journal nor document but instead, one complex intention. 
That would be worse. How can I put these pages in order 
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without knowing what his intention was, without a way 
of moving right inside what he‟s written?) 
“One complex intention” could be a summary of the whole of Memmi‟s 
project; and if we are unable or unwilling to “move right inside” what he 
has written, and if we do not look inside ourselves as we read, we are not 
fulfilling the role of the reader of Memmi‟s work. In Le Scorpion, Memmi 
seemed to be preoccupied with the status of his whole enterprise to date 
(and prophetically, his work in the future) – literary, sociological, personal, 
political – and its possible value. On the one hand literature is a “healthy” 
endeavor, on the other it is futile, merely decorative; his socio-political work 
reveals the mechanisms of human power relations, but does not change 
anything in the real political system. The writer‟s work is at once necessary 
and meaningless. His analyses have helped him and others to understand 
better their place in the world, but he is unsure that any real changes have 
been made. Memmi has written that his whole life has been a battle: a battle 
to be a writer, to master a language, and finally to become a philosopher – 
yet another attempt to master the world.74 Philosophy is for him above all: 
“une sagesse fondée sur les savoirs: l‟art de conduire sa vie le plus 
raisonnablement possible” (a wisdom founded on the branches of 
knowledge: the art of conducting one‟s life as reasonably as possible).75 He 
attempts to remain constantly on guard against pride and self-obsession, 
conscious that he has built a whole body of work on his own experience. 
Much of his work is, indeed, a self-examination in the French philosophical 
tradition that begins with Descartes and Montaigne and which echoes 
throughout literature and philosophy in France thereafter. He does not 
always succeed in his vigilance, and some of the tenets and explanations in 
these later texts become repetitive and sometimes self-justifying as has been 
discussed, some of his personal tastes sit uneasily with the claim to the 
universal based on individual experience. Yet, he tries and that is perhaps 
another final life lesson: he tries to be clear, he tries to think more and to 
think harder. In the epilogue to Le Nomade immobile, Memmi gives a 
description of his personal working environment and of two images which 
resonate with the concerns of Le Scorpion: the redemptive nature of 
confession and the narcissistic nature of writing.76 At the end of such a life 
project, is the writer/philosopher finally able to find satisfaction in his life? 
Memmi seems to suggest that the former poor Jew, former colonized subject, 
uneasy intellectual, part of a minority all his life, has come to an acceptance 
of all the facets of his identity, even though this state remains tentative and 
seems more like a truce than a reconciliation. In texts written decades after 
Le Scorpion, he remains angry at, and scathing of, all doctrines and their 
posturing, and of lazy thought that does not pursue a rational agenda. The 
problems of identity, of belonging and not belonging, of exile and of finding 
a place in the world appear to find some resolution – indeed some kind of 
salvation – in the act of writing. Writing for Memmi is an act that is at once 
necessary and potentially meaningless, hence the necessity of the writer to 
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adopt an ethical position towards the creative process so that it becomes a 
testimony to a way of living, that way of being in the world which was 
evoked earlier. Writing then becomes a very necessary intervention. Memmi 
himself tries to define “cette leçon d‟une vie” which his life represents: 
C‟est une tentative pour découvrir dans le réel [...] une 
triple ou une quadruple cohérence relative : une coherence 
éventuelle entre nos savoirs, si possible une cohérence 
entre nos conduites, les deux liées dans une troisième 
cohérence, entre nos savoirs avérés et nos conduites, ce 
qui devrait nous mener à une certaine sagesse. En somme, 
j‟en attends surtout qu‟elle m‟aide à vivre au mieux.
77
 
(It is an attempt to discover in reality […] a triple or 
quadruple relative coherence: a possible coherence 
between our branches of knowledge, if possible a 
coherence between our behaviors, both linked in a third 
coherence, between our certain knowledge and our 
behavior, which ought to lead us to a certain wisdom. To 
sum up, I expect above all that it will help me to live as 
well as possible.) 
There is then, nothing new to be invented to arrive at wisdom about 
ourselves, we use knowledge that we already possess, but that we have 
perhaps not applied as fully as we could. Perhaps this is why ageing and 
death do not feature as full meditations in Memmi‟s late texts, despite his 
own great age. The lesson of a life is an attempt to apply knowledge gained; 
and it is the attempt then that is most essential, for in the end anyway, as 
Memmi reminds us, philosophy is simply a way of seeing the world, it is 
itself an opinion, and nothing more, but the experience is everything.78 How 
to live?:  
Ai-je appris à vivre, enfin ? [...] A l‟instar de ces gens qui 
font graver sur leur tombe ce qui leur paraît leur 
principale mérite, je souhaite qu‟on mette sur la mienne: 
“il a tenté d‟être sage et réussi quelquefois à être 
heureux. ”
79
 
(Have I learnt how to live, finally? […] Following the 
example of those people who want to have engraved on 
their tombs what they feel to be their principle merit, I 
hope that there will be engraved on mine: „He tried to be 
wise and sometimes succeeded in being happy.‟) 
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